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Abstract
Information systems (IS) security is traditionally seen as technically-oriented. Technologies
alone, however, cannot secure an organization’s information systems at an optimal level. As
such, scholars have called for more research on non-technical factors that play an important
role in IS security, including human, managerial, and organizational issues. This paper aims to
review and synthesize those studies that have been done on non-technical issues by applying
knowledge management concepts as a tool and lens. It also identifies some issues that require
further research.
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1 Introduction
Managing information system security is a big challenge for organizations because they rely
increasingly on information technologies to carry out their business activities. If not properly
managed, systems could be broken and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
information could be compromised. Such security breaches can be costly for organizations. For
example, the network of the TJX Companies, Inc. (TJX) was compromised in 2005 and 2006
and the security breach was estimated to cost the company more than 25 million US dollars
(TJX, 2007a, 2007b).
Given the magnitude and the financial impact of security breaches on businesses, it is important
that we can learn from those incidents happened and understand what the causes are in order to
prevent such breaches in the future. There is little theoretical guide, however, for such
endeavor. The majority of the information systems (IS) security literature is based on expert’s
opinion, anecdotal evidence, or experience (Kotulic & Clark, 2004). One of the possible
reasons is that security is often regarded as technology-oriented. Prior research has emphasized
mostly on technical issues as advanced encryption algorithms, authentication technologies,
anti-virus, firewalls, and so forth. Technical solutions alone, however, do not guarantee
security. Many systems have not been designed to be secure (ISO/IEC, 2005). In order to
improve IS security, scholars have called for more research efforts on organizational problems,
management issues and human behavior issues (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000; Dutta &
McCrohan, 2002; Hitchings, 1995).
This paper aims to review these non-technical security issues from a knowledge management
perspective. This is because IS security management is a knowledge-intensive activity that

depends heavily on IS professionals’ expertise and skills (Belsis et al, 2005). Furthermore, an
organization’s IS security is also dependent on IS users’ awareness of security issues,
particularly how their IS behaviors affect the security of the overall information systems. The
paper applies knowledge management concepts, specifically knowledge management ontology
as a tool and lens to review research in information systems security. By exploring relevant
knowledge and knowledge activities in IS security, this paper closes with a discussion of some
issues that require further study.

2 Knowledge Management Ontology
Ontology is a simplified and explicit specification of a phenomenon (Gruber, 1995). In the
knowledge management (KM) context, a general-purpose ontology is proposed by Holsapple
and Joshi (2003; 2004) as a foundation for KM research, study, and practice. In their KM
ontology, knowledge management is “an entity’s systematic and deliberate efforts to expand,
cultivate, and apply available knowledge”. An entity’s knowledge management work can be
seen as composed of “episodes”. KM episode is defined as the entity’s execution of some
configuration of knowledge manipulation activities (KMA). Such activities are carried by some
processors, who operating on available knowledge resources, with the intent to satisfy a
knowledge need or opportunity. The activities are governed by various types of influences,
which are those factors that determine how the entity manipulates knowledge. KMAs also
result in learning and/or projections of knowledge. Projection refers to the emission of
resources such as knowledge and products into the external environment.
In this KM ontology, two concepts are of particular interest here. The first one is learning,
which is defined as 1) a process where knowledge resources are modified; and 2) an outcome
of a knowledge management episode that involves the change in the state of the entity’s
knowledge. Learning can be functional or dysfunctional. The former indicates a positive
change while the latter involves negative change in the state of the entity’s knowledge.
Learning also occurs whenever knowledge processors detect and correct errors (Argyris, 1995).
The learning process can be better explained with a theory-in-use model (Argyris et al, 1985).
The model depicts the relationship among three concepts: governing variables, action
strategies, and consequences. According to this model, people’s action strategies are decided by
governing variables, which are the values that people seek to satisfy; action strategies have
intended consequences, which people expect to satisfy the global variables. Consequences give
feedback to action strategies and governing variables. There are two forms of learning when the
consequences are unintended: single-loop learning and double-loop learning. In the former
situation, people try to change their actions while in the latter situation it is the governing
variables that are to be changed.
The second concept of interest is knowledge resource, which is defined as the knowledge that
an entity can manipulate in ways to yield value. Knowledge resource is one of the four classes
of organizational resources (the other three are financial, human resources, and material
resources). Knowledge resource can be further analyzed in detailed components. There are two
classes of knowledge resources: schematic knowledge and content knowledge. Schematic
knowledge, which depends on the existence of the entity, has four components: culture,
infrastructure, strategy, and purpose; content knowledge, which on the other hand exists

independently of the entity to which it belongs, has two components: artifacts and participants’
knowledge. Each of the components is defined as follows:
Culture. An organization’s culture refers to the basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by
its members. It includes the organization’s values, principles, norms, traditions, unwritten rules,
and informal procedures.
Infrastructure. An organization’s infrastructure refers to the kind of knowledge that defines the
organization’s roles, the inter-relationships, and the regulations that govern the use of these
roles and relationship. It can be viewed as the counterpart of the culture component of
knowledge resource.
Purpose. An organization’s purpose defines its reason for existence. It includes mission, vision,
objectives, and goals. Purpose is a directional knowledge with which other schematic
knowledge components are to be aligned.
Strategy. An organization’s strategy defines what to do in order to accomplish its purpose. The
strategy may consist of plans for using organizational resources, which includes other
knowledge resource components.
Knowledge artifact. A knowledge artifact is an object that is the representation of knowledge
that may be usable to knowledge processors in an organization. It is one of the knowledge
contents that can exist independent of the organization that holds it. Examples of knowledge
artifacts include books, reports, documents, videos, among others.
Participants’ knowledge. This refers the kind of knowledge that is possessed by employees and
others who participate in the organization’s business activities. In addition to employees,
participants also include customer, partners, suppliers, as well as computer systems.
The above ontology gives a fairly complete picture of knowledge management by identifying
its major components and the interplays among these components. It provides some guidelines
for using knowledge management approaches as a tool to investigate issues related to
knowledge-intensive activities such as IS security management in organizations.

3 IS Security from a Knowledge Management Perspective
In IS security management, one problem needs to be addressed is how organizations manage
security-related knowledge, because IS security management is a knowledge-intensive activity
that depends heavily on IS professionals’ expertise and skills (Belsis et al., 2005). An
organization’s IS security is also dependent on IS users’ awareness of security issues,
particularly how their IS behaviors affect the security of the overall information systems. From
knowledge management ontology perspective, the following three aspects stand out in the IS
security management issue: learning, knowledge resource, and knowledge manipulation
activity.

3.1 Learning
Scholars in IS field have long been advocating more research efforts on organizational
problems, management issues and human behavior issues (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000; Dutta
& McCrohan, 2002; Hitchings, 1995). Indeed, many security problems can be attributed to
these factors. Prior research has found that human error is a significant problem for IS security
(Im & Baskerville, 2005). Im and Baskerville classified three levels of human error that pose as
threats to IS security: 1) skill-based errors, which attribute to mainly monitoring failures; 2)
rule-based errors, which arise if good rules are misapplied or bad rules are applied; and 3)
knowledge-based errors, which are caused by the fact that related knowledge is nearly always
incomplete and often inaccurate. These types of errors are from a rational viewpoint, which
define errors simply as deviation from expected behavior (Neumann, 1995).
Another view regards human error as complex and socially constructed behavior. According to
the action theory (Argyris, 1986; Argyris et al., 1985), such errors or misunderstandings are
created by individuals who unconsciously follow their theories-in-use, a form of “skilled
incompetence”. Argyris et al (1985) distinguish two kinds of theories of action: espoused
theory is what individuals claim to follow; and theories-in-use on the other hand are those that
can be inferred from their action. It is argued that security problems happen when system users’
espoused theory and their theory-in-use are contradictory (Mattia & Dhillon, 2003). An
organization’s espoused-theories may be embedded in its goals, mission, and formal
documents. Based on this argument, Mattia and Dhillon suggest that the double-loop learning
proposed by Argyris et al (1985) can be used as a strategy for designing and implementing
security actions that bring an organization’s espoused-theory and theory-in-use into
congruence.
More specifically, Mattia and Dhillon argue that operational and technical controls, which are
used for routine security activities or emergency situations are types of “single-loop learning”
in Argyris et al’s terms. In other words, such controls focus on the “means” that reach the end
result. In a double-loop learning situation, on the other hand, security practices should not only
focus on the means but also pay attention to the frame or conceptualization of the problem. In
other words, in double-loop security, assumptions underlying management controls should be
questioned. A double-loop security design is proposed by Mattia and Dhillon to include
learning that leads to new security solution, which could be either new actions or new problemsolving. The design has four basic steps: 1) discovering espoused theories and theories in use;
2) bringing the two into congruence and identifying new governing variables; 3) generating
new actions; and 4) generalizing consequences into an organizational match.

3.2 Knowledge resources
Based on the KM ontology (Holsapple & Joshi, 2004), there are six categories of knowledge:
culture, infrastructure, purpose, strategy, artifacts, and participants’ knowledge. The first four
are schematic knowledge and the last two are content knowledge.
3.2.1 Purpose and Strategy
While it is generally understood that the purpose of security is to achieve confidentiality,
availability, and integrity of business information, there has not been many studies on what
kind of strategy that organizations should take to accomplish this purpose, although there is no

shortage of studies to seek innovative and robust technological solutions such as encryption and
access control.
One exception is the discussion by Parker (1997). In terms of the purpose of IS security, Parker
argues that the need of confidentiality is decreasing, i.e. fewer kinds of information require
confidentiality. On the other hand, the importance of ownership, control, integrity, and
authenticity of information is increasing. As such, organizations may need to reconsider the
military-origin classification of information, such as what is confidential and what is top-secret.
Parker further contends that the strategy to achieve confidentiality may also need to change.
Instead of the traditional military-origin “need-to-know” principle, a new discretionary “needto-withhold” principle should be adopted. The latter principle suggests that an organization is
better off by giving everyone in the organization its information except for a small amount that
must be withheld. Another strategy is to rely on the rapid obsolescence of secret information
rather than trying to protect it. For example, by the time competitors obtain the trade secret
information, it may have already been obsolete and useless.
3.2.2 Culture
In the KM ontology, culture refers to norms, beliefs, and basic assumptions shared by the
members of an organization. In the IS security literature, the importance of organizational
culture has been recognized. Information systems security is not a technical problem, but a
social and organizational one that involves people because it is them that operate and use those
systems (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000). An organizational subculture and a common belief
system are needed to make members of the organization committed to their activities that might
have impacts on IS security (Dhillon, 1999). Such culture should also promote responsibility,
integrity of people, trustworthiness, and ethicality (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000).
Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) took a step further to study IS security issues in terms of the
values of people from an organizational perspective. By using the value-focused thinking to
identify fundamental objectives for IS security and the means to achieve them, their study
suggests that organizationally grounded principles and values are necessary for maintaining
security of information systems in organizations. More specifically, Dhillon and Torkzadeh
identified 25 clusters of objectives held by organizational members for IS security. There are
nine fundamental objectives and 16 means objectives. Examples of fundamental objectives
include enhancing management development practices, maximizing integrity of business
processes, and maximizing organizational integrity. Examples of mean objectives include
increasing trust, providing open communication, and maximizing awareness. These objectives
can be used for developing IS security measures.
Smith and Hasnas (1999) investigated the ethical issues in information systems in general.
While raising an important issue of ethics in IS, their study identifies some challenges facing
organizations when they deal with ethical dilemmas. One of the challenges is that applying
different ethical theories on the same ethical situation may have conflicting conclusions. Thus,
it is important for organizations to pay attention to this issue and have a clear communication
with employees in terms of what kinds of behavior are considered ethical and acceptable
related to information systems use in general and security in particular.

3.2.3 Infrastructure
In the KM ontology, infrastructure refers to an organization’s roles, their relationships, and the
regulations that govern them. In the context of information system security, policy, as one type
of organizational regulation, is of particular interest.
Security policy refers to the set of rules, and practices that regulate how an organization
manages, protects, and distributes its resources to achieve specified security objectives (Sterne,
1991). Security objectives are often reflected in the purpose and strategy as discussed
previously. Recognizing the limitation of existing security policy approach, Baskerville and
Siponen (2002) proposed a meta-policy as a guide to establish how policies should be created,
implemented, and enforced. Some of the policy features are: 1) policy requirements, which
include identification and classification of security subjects and objects, as well as the
elaboration of the process by which the organization will determine who need to access what
information; 2) How policies is designed, e.g. the creation of policy and sub-policies hierarchy
and when the adjustment of the level of abstraction and enforcement needed; and 3) How
policies are to be implemented, and if necessary how they should be tested in order to
determine whether the goals of policies are met.
Siponen and Iivari, on the other hand, take a different theoretical perspective to study the
design of successful IS security polices and guidelines (2006). They identify six normative
theories that can offer insights on how IS policies and guidelines handle exceptional situations,
where business opportunities may require temporary violations of those policies and guidelines.
Marchinkowski and Stanton (2003) analyzed extant information security policies from a
number of organizations to ascertain the motivational assumption. Although motivation is just
one of several factors associated with effective policy, the study found that motivation factors
do not receive enough attention in the research or practitioner literatures. It also raised a
question of how information security figures into employees’ performance evaluations.
3.2.4 Artifacts
An artifact in the KM ontology refers to an object is or hold a representation of knowledge that
may be useful for a knowledge processor in the organization. Examples of such artifact include
documents and reports. In the IS security context, Belsis et al (2005) conducted a field research
and identified a number of security-related knowledge artifact (“sources”). These artifacts can
be classified into three levels of abstraction: strategic, tactical, and operations. Strategic-level
artifacts include security policy document, which deals with the design and dissemination of
security policies. At tactical level, the artifacts include risk analysis document, documented
countermeasures, audit trail reports, automatic logs, and audit documentation. At the operations
level, the knowledge artifacts include network alerts and logs.
Two types of artifacts widely used in information systems security are checklist and standards.
Checklists are based on the assumption that solutions and procedures can be observed and
turned into a list, hence “checklist”, for solving security problems (Siponen, 2005). Examples

of such IS security checklists include the risk checklist proposed by Moulton & Moulton (1996)
and the control checklist proposed by Wood et al (1987). IS security standards are usually the
best practices for managing security in organizations. One example of such standards is
ISO/IEC 27002. The standard “establishes guidelines and general principles for initiating,
implementing, maintaining, and improving information security management in an
organization” (ISO/IEC, 2005). It contains best practices of control objectives and controls in
areas of information security management such as security policy, physical and environmental
security, access control, among others.
3.2.5 Participants’ knowledge
In the KM ontology, participant’s knowledge refers the knowledge that is possessed by a
knowledge processor who participates in the organization’s business activities. Participants can
be employees, customers, or suppliers, among others. In the IS security context, however,
research seemed to have been focusing on employees who use the organization’s information
systems to carry out their routine business activities.
From a domain perspective, employees’ knowledge can be classified as business knowledge
and information technology (IT) knowledge. Information systems security knowledge can be
viewed as a sub-category of IT knowledge. Understandably, as a common sense IT and IS
security people have necessary IT knowledge to manage organizational information systems;
and end-users (or business people) have necessary business knowledge to carry business
activities and make critical decisions.
In order to achieve effective security management, however, IT people should also have
necessary business knowledge. Such business knowledge is critical for IT people to understand
how IT risks impact the organization’s business performance and to manage security in a costeffective manner. It will also enable IT people to have better communications with end-users
and business people. Such knowledge is also defined as “business competence of IT
professionals” (Bassellier & Benbasat, 2004), which is comprised of organization-specific
knowledge and interpersonal and management knowledge. The former can be further broken
down to more specific areas of knowledge: organizational overview, organizational unit,
organizational responsibility, and IT-business integration; and the latter can be broken down to
areas of knowledge networking, interpersonal communication, and leadership.
IT knowledge of end-users is equally important for effective security management. Lack of
necessary IT knowledge and skills causes human errors, which are a significant issue for
information systems security (Im & Baskerville, 2005). Such IT knowledge and skills are also
defined as “IT competence” (Bassellier et al, 2001).
Based on its mode, IT competence can be classified as explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge
(Nonaka, 1994; Polanyi, 1962). Explicit knowledge is often codified and can be transmitted in
formal and systematic language; tacit knowledge, on the other hand, involves personal quality
and is difficult to be formalized and transmitted. Based on Bassellier et al’s classification, endusers’ explicit IT knowledge include knowledge in areas of technology, applications, systems
development, management of IT, and access to IT knowledge (e.g. knowing who to contact for
more information on IT); tacit knowledge includes end-users’ experience in IT projects and
experience in the management of IT.

Based on its primary type, IT knowledge of end-users can be classified into descriptive,
procedural, and reasoning knowledge (Holsapple & Whinston, 1996). Each of them describes
some different aspect of a knowledge object. Descriptive knowledge is about the “state of some
world”, which include descriptions of past, present, future, and hypothetical situations. It is
about “know what”. Procedural knowledge is about the detailed procedures of doing
something. It is about “know how”. Reasoning knowledge, however, specifies the conclusions
that can be drawn from certain pre-conditions. It is about “know why”. It can be argued that
this classification scheme loosely reflects the “depth” of knowledge. Descriptive knowledge is
the least in-depth while reasoning knowledge is the most in-depth understanding of a subject
matter. According to this classification, the explicit IT knowledge (Bassellier et al., 2001) falls
into the category of descriptive knowledge, because it focuses on “the understanding of benefits
of different IT, not on their specific features”.
In the IS security context, some studies focused on the end-users’ awareness of security
problem. Such awareness can also be classified as a descriptive knowledge in terms of general
understanding of security issues but without in-depth “know-how” and “know-why”. Siponen
(2000; 2001) investigated IS security awareness from a human behavioral perspective and
argued that more focus should be put on normative and prescriptive awareness.

3.3 Knowledge Manipulation Activity
In the KM ontology, knowledge manipulation activity refers to the acquisition, selection,
generation, assimilation, and emission of knowledge, which occur in the “conduct of
knowledge management” (Holsapple & Joshi, 2004).
In the IS security context, organizational security planning is one of such knowledge
manipulation activities. Straub and Welke (1998) proposed a security planning model for
management decision-making on security issues. The security risk planning model includes
four phases: 1) recognition of security problem or need; 2) risk analysis; 3) alternatives
generation; and 4) planning decision. Each phase involves some processes of knowledge
resources. For example, risk analysis may involves an understanding of organizational strategy,
end-users’ general level of IT knowledge and skills, and the design documentation of an
information system, among others. Such analysis may generate a list of risks and their
priorities. Taking this knowledge of risk as an input, the next phase may generate a list of
alternatives that might alleviate the risks. This kind of knowledge activities may go on until a
decision is made. The output could be a documented IS security strategy, which is also a
knowledge resource according to the KM ontology.
A similar approach is the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation
(OCTAVE) Framework (Alberts et al, 1999). The OCTAVE framework has three phases: 1)
building enterprise-wide security requirement; 2) identifying infrastructure vulnerabilities; and
3) demining security risk management strategy. Similar to that of previous approach, each
phase in this OCTAVE framework involves the knowledge manipulation activities. For
example, in the first phase of assessment, several types of knowledge need to be analyzed:
enterprise knowledge, operational area knowledge, and staff knowledge.

4 Discussion and Future Research
This paper reviewed research in information systems security from a knowledge management
perspective. More specifically, it applied the knowledge management ontology to investigate
knowledge and knowledge activities associated with IS security. It found that the current IS
security research on non-technical factors has been focusing on three aspects: knowledge
resources, knowledge manipulation activities, and learning.
There has not been sufficient research, however, on the other two aspects of knowledge
management ontology: knowledge influence and projection. Knowledge influences include
managerial, resources, and environmental factors, all of which could impact the overall security
management organizations. It is not clear, however, how and to what extent these factors
impact IS security. One research in this direction is the study by Knapp et al (2006). They
found that top management’s support is a significant predictor of security culture and policy
enforcement in organizations.
Projection is the other aspect that future research could be conducted. One specific area is
security knowledge sharing among organizations such as businesses, software vendors, and
security solution providers. Possible research questions include how and why organizations
share security knowledge such as virus information and software vulnerabilities, what benefits
organizations can achieve by sharing such knowledge, and what factors encourage or
discourage organizations to share their security knowledge.
The literature review also revealed two issues that worth further research. The first issue is
what kind of strategy can best manage information systems security. Parker (1997) contrasted
two different strategies: need-to-know approach and need-to-withhold approach. The question
is, can the latter approach perform better than the former? What are the conditions,
environmental or organizational, should be met in order for this to happen? The second issue is
what level of business knowledge is needed for IT professionals and what level of IT
knowledge is needed for business people and end-users. Although prior research suggested that
both types of knowledge are important for the two groups of people, it is still unclear what level
of knowledge is optimal.
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